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Government policies that are not intended to address environmental concerns can nonetheless distort
prices and affect firms' emissions.  We present an analytical general equilibrium model to study the
effect of distortionary subsidies on factor prices and on environmental outcomes.  We model an output
subsidy, a capital subsidy, relief from environmental regulation, and a direct cash subsidy.  In exchange
for receiving subsidies, firms must agree to a minimum level of labor employment.  Each type of subsidy
and the employment constraint create both output effects and substitution effects on input prices and
emissions.  We calibrate the model to the Chinese economy, where government involvement affects
emissions from both state-owned enterprises and private firms.  Variation in production substitution
elasticities does not substantially affect input prices, but it does substantially affect emissions.
Garth Heutel
Bryan 466, Department of Economics
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Nearly all governments support particular firms or sectors by granting low-interest 
financing, reduced regulation, tax relief, price supports, monopoly rights, and a variety of other 
subsidies.  Subsidies are not lump sum, but instead introduce distortions by favoring particular 
firms, sectors, and/or inputs.  This paper determines the incidence and environmental effects of 
distortions induced by these subsidies, which are particularly common in environmentally-
sensitive industries.  The model is calibrated and simulated to study the Chinese economy. 
Many studies in environmental economics examine the effect of some environmental 
regulation on the environment, e.g. how efficient a cap-and-trade scheme is at reducing 
emissions relative to a command-and-control standard.  Others examine the effects of 
environmental regulations on non-environmental outcomes, e.g. if strict emissions regulations 
reduce employment or capital investment. These are often referred to as unintended 
consequences of environmental regulations.  Conversely, this model examines a different type of 
unintended consequences: the effects of non-environmental policies on the environment.  The 
subsidies that we model are not necessarily intended to address environmental issues, but 
because they affect prices and firms’ decisions in general equilibrium, such effects occur. 
We present a two-sector general equilibrium model of an economy in which one sector 
receives subsidies and the other does not.  Our motivating example is the Chinese economy, in 
which a large fraction of the economy is composed of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), receiving 
subsidies from the government and coexisting alongside private firms.  We consider four 
different ways in which regulators interfere with the subsidized sector.  First, SOEs may have 
easier or cheaper access to capital or to loans, modeled here as an interest subsidy.  Fisher-
Vanden and Ho (2007) documents and studies substantial interest subsidies to Chinese 
industries, including energy-intensive industries.  Second, SOEs may receive an output subsidy.   
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) model the Chinese economy where subsidies to output play a 
prominent role.  Third, SOEs may face less stringent environmental standards, modeled as a 
subsidy to an emissions tax.  Dasgupta et. al. (2001) show that Chinese SOEs have more 
bargaining power and are therefore their pollution is monitored less intensively.  Fourth and 
lastly, SOEs incur extra costs along with the subsidies.  In particular, SOEs are subject to a 
regulation on the amount of labor that must be employed by them.  Yin (2001) models 
overstaffing among Chinese SOEs and argues that overstaffing is widespread.   
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While our motivating example is the Chinese economy, our analytical model is general 
enough to apply to several other examples.  Other nations besides China exhibit these types of 
economy-wide subsidies.  Bergoeing et. al. (2002) study output and interest subsidies in Chile 
and Mexico.  Barde and Honkatukia (2004) list subsidies among various OECD countries.  The 
model also applies to policies within a country targeted at a single industry.  For instance, the 
U.S. auto bailout in 2008-2009 fits this model, since the subsidies implicit in the bailout were 
aimed at only at some domestic, not foreign, manufacturers operating in the US.  In this 
application, the labor constraint could be due to union contracts rather than government 
regulation. Similarly, the airline industry could be modeled where the distinction between 
subsidized and non-subsidized firms follows the distinction between legacy and low-cost 
carriers.  Lastly, the model could be applied to subsidization of a particular industry within an 
economy; for instance agricultural subsidies within OECD countries. 
Our subsidies differ from typical analysis of the incidence of subsidies or taxes in the 
literature in that only some firms receive subsidies.  In our equilibrium, subsidized and non-
subsidized (hereafter private) firms coexist only if subsidized firms are less productive. This 
matches the empirical observation that subsidies tend to go to firms to prevent bankruptcy or to 
support distressed firms facing foreign or domestic competition.  
We find that subsidies tied to the use of a particular input (e.g. low interest loans, relief 
from environmental regulation) have three effects.  First, subsidized firms tend to increase 
demand for the subsidized input (capital, emissions) at the expense of substitute inputs. This 
substitution effect increases economy-wide demand for the subsidized input. Second, the 
subsidized firm tends to produce more, increasing demand by the subsidized firm for all inputs 
(an output effect).  Third, in general equilibrium, as input prices change, the private and 
subsidized firms alter their usage of inputs. Overall, the price of the subsidized input and 
complementary inputs increase at the expense of substitute inputs, and the subsidized sector 
grows in size. Output subsidies can be viewed as a subsidy to all inputs, and therefore the 
substitution effect described above is not present, though the output effect is.   
In our model, firms must use a minimum quantity of labor in exchange for receiving 
subsidies.  If the minimum labor constraint binds, the marginal product of labor in the subsidized 
sector falls below the wage and subsidized firms earn negative profits.  The government then 
provides a cash subsidy (hereafter a direct subsidy) to prevent subsidized firms from exiting the 
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market. Increasing the minimum labor constraint moves labor from the private to the subsidized 
sector.  The demand for capital therefore increases in the subsidized sector but decreases in the 
private sector.  The interest rate rises if the subsidized sector is more capital intensive than the 
private sector. 
To gauge the magnitude of the effects, we calibrate our model to the Chinese economy, 
where the distinction between subsidized and private firms is clear in our data.  We simulate for 
base-case parameter values and conduct sensitivity analysis over the parameters describing each 
sector's substitution elasticities in production.  The key determinant of the incidence (the changes 
in factor prices) of the policies is the factor intensities; in our simulation where the subsidized 
sector is relatively capital-intensive, subsidies hurt labor more than they hurt capital.  This 
pattern is unaffected by the substitution elasticity values.  In contrast, the effects on emissions 
depend crucially on the substitution elasticity values.  The greater the ability of one sector to 
substitute into emissions away from an alternate input whose price increases, the larger that 
sector's emissions increase.   
In many developing countries, subsidies of the type we study are a significant fraction of 
GDP.  For example, Brandt and Zhu (2000) report that subsidies in China amount to 6.8% of 
GDP in 1993.  Further, van Beers and van den Bergh (2001) estimate worldwide subsidies are 
3.6% of world GDP in the mid-1990s.  Barde and Honkatukia (2004), report agriculture, fishing, 
energy (especially coal), manufacturing, transport, and water are all heavily subsidized, 
environmentally sensitive industries. 
  Despite the prevalence of subsidies, little is known about their general equilibrium 
effect on factor prices and the environment.  Barde and Honkatukia (2004) discuss a few 
channels by which subsidies may affect the quality of the environment.  Input and output 
subsidies, especially in environmentally sensitive industries, encourage the overuse of dirty 
inputs.  Bailouts, tax relief, and other cash subsidies prevent the exit from the market of the least 
efficient producers, which are likely to be the most emissions intensive, which they call a 
“technology lock-in” effect. Subsidies in the form of regulatory relief include exemptions from 
environmental regulation, which directly increase the incentive to emit.  Still, their analysis is 
largely informal.  Indeed, they note that "a thorough assessment would require a complex set of 
general equilibrium analysis (to evaluate the rebound effect on the economy).''1 This paper 
                                                 
1 Barde and Honkatukia (2004), page 268. 
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provides such a general equilibrium analysis, including all of the above channels.  Fullerton and 
Heutel (2010), (2007) use similar analytical methods to study the incidence of taxes (2007 paper) 
and environmental mandates (2010 paper) but not non-environmental policies like subsidies.   
Subsidies can also be used to protect favored industries against foreign competition.  
Indeed, many trade agreements explicitly call for a reduction in subsidies.  For example, Bajona 
and Kelly (2012) examine the effect on the environment of eliminating the subsidies required for 
China to enter the WTO and find that elimination of subsidies reduces steady state emissions of 
three of four pollutants studied. van Beers and van den Bergh (2001) show in a static, partial 
equilibrium setting how subsidies increase output and therefore emissions in a small open 
economy.  For example, if subsidies are sufficiently large, a country may move from importing 
to exporting an environmentally sensitive good.  The increase in output in turn increases 
emissions. 
A number of authors study the effect of agricultural subsidies on the environment  (Antle, 
Lekakis and Zanias 1998), (Pasour and Rucker 2005).  Price supports and output and input 
subsidies encourage the use of dirty inputs such as fertilizer and pesticides, and encourage 
marginal land to be converted from conservation to farming.  On the other hand, the USDA in 
2003 had over 17 agricultural subsidy programs ($1.9 billion) designed in part to improve 
environmental quality, primarily by paying farmers to remove environmentally sensitive land 
from production (Pasour and Rucker 2005).  However, such restrictions have an ambiguous 
effect on erosion and on fertilizer and pesticide use, since such restrictions encourage farmers to 
farm the remaining land more intensively (Pasour and Rucker 2005, 110).  Other subsidies, such 
as output subsidies, magnify this effect.  It is therefore important to analyze all subsidies together 
in general equilibrium, as they can have offsetting or magnifying effects. 
Previous work has provided an important first step in identifying the extent of subsidies 
and likely channels by which they effect the environment.  Still, the previous literature does not 
examine the incidence of subsidies, and most prior work looks at individual subsidies in partial 
equilibrium. An exception is Bajona and Kelly (2012), who provide a model where private and 
subsidized firms coexist.  They prove the existence of a general equilibrium in which subsidized 
firms and private firms co-exist with the share of production of subsidized firms determined 
endogenously by the subsidies, labor requirement, and technology difference. Bajona and Kelly 
(2012) consider only two kinds of subsidies, direct subsidies and interest subsidies.  We extend 
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their framework by considering as well output subsidies and regulatory relief and by making 
emissions endogenous.2   
  
II. Model 
Consider a closed economy consisting of two representative firms producing an identical 
output good.  Each firm has access to a production technology utilizing three inputs: capital, 
labor, and pollution.  Production here is net of abatement costs, so higher pollution input means 
lower abatement costs, and therefore higher net production.3  One firm is subsidized by the 
government, as described later; call its output level G.  The other firm is non-subsidized or 
private; call its output level  P.  The subsidized firm's production function is 
𝐺 = 𝐴𝐺𝐹(𝐾𝐺 , 𝐿𝐺 ,𝐸𝐺), 
where  KG, LG,  and  EG  are the quantities of capital, labor, and pollution used by the subsidized 
firm, and  AG  is total factor productivity. We assume F  is a constant returns to scale function.  
Similarly, 
𝑃 = 𝐴𝑃𝐹(𝐾𝑃, 𝐿𝑃,𝐸𝑃), 
with  AP, KP, LP,  and  EP  defined analogously.  Henceforth, we normalize AP  to one. 
Households supply 𝐾� units of capital and 𝐿� units of labor inelastically.  Thus, 
𝐾𝑃 + 𝐾𝐺 = 𝐾�, 
𝐿𝑃 + 𝐿𝐺 = 𝐿�. 
Totally differentiating each of these equations, noting that both  𝐾�  and  𝐿�  are constant, yields 
 𝐾�𝑃𝜆𝐾𝑃 + 𝐾�𝐺𝜆𝐾𝐺 = 0, (1) 
 𝐿�𝑃𝜆𝐿𝑃 + 𝐿�𝐺𝜆𝐿𝐺 = 0. (2) 
Here  𝜆𝑖𝑗  is the fraction of the total supply of factor i that is employed by firm  j  (e.g.  
𝜆𝐾𝑃 = 𝐾𝑃/𝐾� ).  A variable with a caret represents a proportional change in that variable (e.g.  
𝐾�𝑃 ≡ 𝑑𝐾𝑝/𝐾𝑃). 
The private firm faces three prices, r, w, and τ,  for inputs  KP, LP, and EP,  respectively.  
The price of pollution τ is a government policy variable, while the prices of capital and labor are 
endogenous. We follow Mieszkowski (1972) in modeling the private firm's choices over its 
                                                 
2 Bajona and Kelly (2012) also focus on trade effects, whereas the focus of the current paper is on incidence. 
3 See, for example, Bartz and Kelly (2008) for a derivation of a production function with pollution as an input from 
abatement cost functions.    
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inputs. Totally differentiating the private firm's three input demand equations yields two 
independent equations: 4  
  𝐾�𝑃 − 𝐿�𝑃 = �𝑒𝑃,𝐾𝐾 − 𝑒𝑃,𝐾𝐿�𝜃𝑃𝐾?̂? + �𝑒𝑃,𝐾𝐸 − 𝑒𝑃,𝐸𝐿�𝜃𝑃𝐸?̂? + �𝑒𝑃,𝐾𝐿 − 𝑒𝑃,𝐿𝐿�𝜃𝑃𝐿𝑤� , (3) 
 𝐸�𝑃 − 𝐿�𝑃 = �𝑒𝑃,𝐾𝐸 − 𝑒𝑃,𝐾𝐿�𝜃𝑃𝐾?̂? + �𝑒𝑃,𝐸𝐸 − 𝑒𝑃,𝐸𝐿�𝜃𝑃𝐸?̂? + �𝑒𝑃,𝐸𝐿 − 𝑒𝑃,𝐿𝐿�𝜃𝑃𝐿𝑤� . (4) 
The parameters  eP,ij  are the Allen elasticities of substitution (Allen 1938).  The Allen 
elasticity eP,ij is positive when inputs i and j are substitutes and negative when they are 
complements.  The own price Allen elasticity  eP,ii  is always negative.  The parameters 𝜃𝑃𝑖 
represent the share of total revenue spent on input i in sector P,  e.g.  𝜃𝑃𝐾 ≡ 𝑟𝐾𝑝/𝑞𝑃𝑃,  where  qP  
is the output price the good.  Constant returns to scale implies zero profits, so  𝜃𝑃𝐾 + 𝜃𝑃𝐿 +
𝜃𝑃𝐸 = 1.     
Totally differentiating the private firm's zero-profit condition yields 
 𝑞�𝑃 + 𝑃� = 𝜃𝑃𝐾�?̂? + 𝐾�𝑃� + 𝜃𝑃𝐿�𝑤� + 𝐿�𝑃� + 𝜃𝑃𝐸(?̂? + 𝐸�𝑃). (5) 
Totally differentiating the private firm's production function and substituting in the first-
order conditions from the firm's profit maximization problem (marginal revenue product equals 
marginal cost, for each input) gives 
 𝑃� = 𝜃𝑃𝐾𝐾�𝑃 + 𝜃𝑃𝐿𝐿�𝑃 + 𝜃𝑃𝐸𝐸�𝑃. (6) 
The subsidized firm faces a different problem than the private firm, in four aspects.  First, 
subsidized firms receive a discount on their capital costs.  The discount may arise from the 
government guaranteeing repayment of funds borrowed by subsidized firms, direct loans from 
the government at reduce interest rates, state owned enterprises (SOEs) borrowing at the 
government's rate of interest, or as the government steering deposits at state-owned banks to 
subsidized firms (common in developing countries) at reduced interest rates.  Any of these 
implicit or explicit subsidies imply a lower effective rental price of capital for the subsidized 
firm, 𝑟𝐺  =  (1 –  𝛾)𝑟, where γ is the interest subsidy rate. 
Second, subsidized firms receive a subsidy of 𝜀 per unit of output. The output subsidy 
may also be interpreted as a price support that applies only to the subsidized firm (for example, 
the government buys excess demand above the market price from the subsidized firm and 
                                                 
4 The analytical general equilibrium modeling and solution strategy that we employ is in the style of Harberger 
(1962).  Other papers using similar methods include Mieszkowski (1972), Fullerton and Metcalf (2002), Fullerton 
and Heutel (2007), and Fullerton and Heutel (2010).  See, for example, Fullerton and Heutel (2007, p. 588-9) for a 
derivation of equations (3)-(4). 
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distributes the goods to households). If the consumer price of subsidized firm output is 𝑞𝐺, then 
the effective output price that the subsidized firm faces is  𝑞𝐺𝑁 = (1 + 𝜀)𝑞𝐺.   
Third, the government reduces the environmental regulatory burden the subsidized firm 
faces.  In particular, the subsidized firm pays a pollution tax rate of 𝜏𝐺 = 𝜏(1 − 𝜙).  Here 1 − 𝜙 
may also represent the fraction of emissions reported by the subsidized firm if for example the 
government monitors subsidized firms less often (Gupta and Saksena (2002) find subsidized 
SOEs are monitored less often, and Wang et. al. (2003) find SOEs enjoy bargaining power over 
environmental compliance).  As with Fisher-Vanden and Ho (2007), we are able to investigate 
how environmental regulations interact with other subsidies, like a capital subsidy. 
Fourth, if subsidized and non-subsidized firms co-exist, some cost to receiving subsidies 
must exist. Following Bajona and Kelly (2012), we model this cost in a simple way.  In 
particular, we assume that in order to receive subsidies, the government requires labor 
employment at subsidized firms to be greater than or equal to 𝐿�𝐺 .  The minimum labor constraint 
means the cost of receiving subsidies is a labor cost, which may include hiring lobbyists and/or 
hiring labor in key districts to increase bargaining power.5 In exchange for employing 𝐿�𝐺 , the 
government covers any losses through a direct subsidy (cash payment), S.  The labor constraint 
binds if and only if the marginal product of labor in subsidized firms is below the wage rate, 
which causes subsidized firms to earn negative profits. Subsidized and private firms then co-exist 
if subsidized firms receive a direct subsidy large enough for the subsidized firm's profits to be 
non-negative, including the direct subsidy. If the constraint does not bind, subsidized firms have 
a competitive advantage and will drive the private firms from the market.  Since this case is less 
interesting, we consider only the case where the constraint binds.   
The subsidized firm's cost-minimization problem is analogous to the private firm's cost-
minimization problem, except the subsidized firm faces different input costs (for example, 
replacing  r  with  rG,  the subsidized capital price) and the binding constraint on labor input, 𝐿�𝐺 . 
Because of this constraint, the subsidized firm no longer is able to set its marginal revenue 
product of labor equal to the wage.  Rather, the constraint creates a shadow price of labor for the 
subsidized firm, denoted  wG.  This shadow price equals the difference between the market wage 
                                                 
5 Shleifer and Vishny (1994) present a political economy model explaining why such labor constraints may arise in a 
bargaining process as a result of the other types of subsidies modeled here. 
9 
 
w and the multiplier on the labor constraint. Since we always assume that the labor constraint is 
binding, the market price w is strictly greater than the shadow price wG.     
The solution to the firm's cost-minimization problem can thus be written in terms of the 
shadow price of the constraint and the other subsidized prices in a manner similar to equations 
(3) and (4).6   
 𝐾�𝐺 − 𝐿�𝐺 = �𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐾 − 𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐿�𝜃𝐺𝐾?̂?𝐺 + �𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐸 − 𝑒𝐺,𝐸𝐿�𝜃𝐺𝐸?̂?𝐺 + �𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐿 − 𝑒𝐺,𝐿𝐿�𝜃𝐺𝐿�𝑤�𝐺 (7) 
 𝐸�𝐺 − 𝐿�𝐺 = �𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐸 − 𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐿�𝜃𝐺𝐾?̂?𝐺 + �𝑒𝐺,𝐸𝐸 − 𝑒𝐺,𝐸𝐿�𝜃𝐺𝐸?̂?𝐺 + �𝑒𝐺,𝐸𝐿 − 𝑒𝐺,𝐿𝐿�𝜃𝐺𝐿�𝑤�𝐺 (8) 
In equations (7) and (8), the parameters  𝜃𝐺𝐾  and  𝜃𝐺𝐸   are the share of total subsidized firm 
revenues paid to capital and pollution, respectively, less government subsidies (e.g. 𝜃𝐺𝐾 ≡
𝑟𝐺𝐾𝐺/𝑞𝐺𝑁𝐺).  However, the parameter 𝜃𝐺𝐿�  is not equal to 𝑤𝐿𝐺/𝑝𝐺𝑁𝐺. Rather, 𝜃𝐺𝐿� ≡
𝑤𝐺𝐿𝐺/𝑝𝐺𝑁𝐺.  In equations (7) and (8), demand for labor is a function of prices.  Although the 
constraint implies 𝐿𝐺 = 𝐿�𝐺 ,  the constraint creates the shadow price wG  so that labor demand 
under that shadow price, according to equations (7) and (8), is just equal to the minimum labor.  
That is, the subsidized firm faces a shadow price of labor lower than the wage, which encourages 
the subsidized firm to use more labor than it otherwise would have used. 
The subsidized firm's profits are 
𝜋𝐺 = 𝑞𝐺𝑁𝐺 − 𝑟𝐺𝐾𝐺 − 𝑤𝐿𝐺 − 𝜏𝐺𝐸𝐺 + 𝑆. 
We first model the case where equilibrium profits, net of subsidies, must equal zero.  Such an 
equilibrium condition might arise under free entry, for example.7 In this case, one of the subsidy 
values is determined in equilibrium; we assume that the zero-profit condition determines S once 
the regulator chooses all of the other subsidies. Substituting the firm's first-order conditions from 
the cost-minimization problem into the zero-profit condition implies: 
𝜋𝐺 =  𝑞𝐺𝑁𝐺 −  𝑞𝐺𝑁𝐺𝐾𝐾𝐺 −  𝑞𝐺𝑁𝐺𝐸𝐸𝐺 − 𝑤𝐿𝐺 + 𝑆 = 0, 
where  GK  and  GE  are the derivatives of the production function with respect to inputs capital 
and pollution.  Then, since production is constant returns to scale, using Euler's theorem for 
homogeneous functions yields 
𝜋𝐺 = 𝑤𝐺𝐿𝐺 − 𝑤𝐿𝐺 + 𝑆 = 0. 
                                                 
6 An alternate method of modeling the binding labor constraint does not use the shadow price of labor, and instead 
derives equations similar to (7) and (8) but that are in terms of the value of the labor constraint itself rather than the 
shadow price.  This is similar to the method in Fullerton and Heutel (2010).  This solution method is available upon 
request from the authors. 
7 Alternatively, if one interprets S as a “bailout,” the government may be motivated only prevent bankruptcy, not to 
give positive profits to the subsidized firm.   
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Thus equilibrium subsidies are 𝑆 = (𝑤 − 𝑤𝐺)𝐿𝐺 > 0,  since the minimum labor constraint binds. 
Substituting equilibrium direct subsidies into the zero profit condition and totally differentiating 
yields 
 𝑞�𝐺𝑁 + 𝐺� = 𝜃𝐺𝐾�?̂?𝐺 + 𝐾�𝐺� + 𝜃𝐺𝐿��𝑤�𝐺 + 𝐿�𝐺� + 𝜃𝐺𝐸(?̂?𝐺 + 𝐸�𝐺). (9) 
Similarly, totally differentiating the production function and substituting in the first-order 
conditions from the profit-maximization problem yields 
 𝐺� = 𝜃𝐺𝐾𝐾�𝐺 + 𝜃𝐺𝐿�𝐿�𝐺 + 𝜃𝐺𝐸𝐸�𝐺. (10) 
The direct subsidy S drops out of equations (7)-(10).  One could solve for the change in the direct 
subsidy by totally differentiating 𝑆 = (𝑤 − 𝑤𝐺)𝐿𝐺, but it is not necessary to include to solve the 
system (that would add one equation and one variable that does not show up in any other 
equation).  Intuitively, the lump-sum subsidy does not affect the firm's decisions and therefore 
has no effect on any general equilibrium outcomes.8 
It follows that the equations describing the subsidized firm's decisions (equations (7) 
through (10)) are independent of the assumption that the firm earns zero profits.  Indeed, we 
could assume instead that the firm's profits 𝜋𝐺  are allowed to be positive, and that the level of 
firm profits is an exogenous policy parameter that can be controlled by the government.  That is, 
the profits  𝜋𝐺   represent rents that the regulator allows the firm to capture, perhaps through 
barriers to entry.   
To see this, assume that 𝜋𝐺 > 0.  Then the equation relating firm profits to the shadow price 
of the constraint still holds, but firm profits no longer must equal zero: 
𝜋𝐺 = 𝑤𝐺𝐿𝐺 − 𝑤𝐿𝐺 + 𝑆. 
The endogenous direct subsidy S  is now larger, given the positive exogenous level of profit  𝜋𝐺 .  
Totally differentiating this equation yields 
𝜋�𝐺 = 𝛽𝑤𝐺�𝑤�𝐺 + 𝐿�𝐺� − 𝛽𝑤�𝑤� + 𝐿�𝐺� + 𝛽𝑆?̂?, 
where  𝛽𝑤𝐺 ≡
𝑤𝐺𝐿G
𝜋𝐺
,  𝛽𝑤 ≡
𝑤𝐿G
𝜋𝐺
,  and  𝛽𝑆 ≡
𝑆
𝜋𝐺
.  Similarly, totally differentiating the definition of 
the firm's profits yields 
𝜋�𝐺 = 𝛽𝑝𝐺�?̂?𝐺𝑁 + 𝐺�� − 𝛽𝑟�?̂?𝐺 + 𝐾�𝐺� − 𝛽𝜏�?̂?𝐺 + 𝐸�𝐺� − 𝛽𝑤�𝑤� + 𝐿�𝐺� + 𝛽𝑆?̂?, 
                                                 
8 The subsidized firm can only increase direct subsidies by increasing losses, so the direct subsidy is lump sum in the 
sense that profits net of subsidies are unchanged regardless of the subsidized firm's decisions. 
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where  𝛽𝑝𝐺 ≡
𝐺𝑝𝐺𝑁
𝜋𝐺
,  𝛽𝜏 ≡
𝜏𝐺𝐸𝐺
𝜋𝐺
,  and  𝛽𝑟 ≡
𝑟𝐺𝐾𝐺
𝜋𝐺
.  Combining the above two equations, canceling 
terms, and multiplying everything by  𝜋𝐺
𝑞𝐺𝑁𝐺
  yields equation (9).  The derivation of equation (10) 
does not depend on the assumption of zero profits.  Thus, equations (7) through (10) hold as long 
as the direct subsidy is large enough so that subsidized profits are non-negative.  We are 
interested in the case where both firms choose to operate, where neither firm is at a corner 
solution for any of its input demands, and our differential analysis is applicable.  The condition 
𝑆 ≥ (𝑤 − 𝑤𝐺)𝐿𝐺 ensures the subsidized firm operates, and the private firm operates if and only 
if the cost of receiving subsidies is positive, which occurs when the minimum labor constraint 
binds, 𝑤 − 𝑤𝐺 > 0.9 
Finally, the minimum labor constraint binds: 
 𝐿��𝐺 = 𝐿�𝐺 . (11) 
Thus equations (7)-(11) characterize the subsidized firm's decisions.  An alternative method to 
incorporating the binding labor constraint would be to set the input demand equation for labor 
equal to the labor constraint, then totally differentiate: 
  𝐿��𝐺 = 𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐿𝜃𝐺𝐾?̂?𝐺 + 𝑒𝐺,𝐸𝐿𝜃𝐺𝐸?̂?𝐺 + 𝑒𝐺,𝐿𝐿𝜃𝐺𝐿�𝑤�𝐺 + 𝐺�.  (11') 
Equation (11') demonstrates that the input demand equation, in terms of the Allen elasticities and 
the input prices, characterizes the subsidized firm's demand for labor, which must equal the 
required minimum labor. It can be shown that equation (11') can be derived from equations (7), 
(8) and (11) given known restrictions on the Allen elasticities. Thus, replacing equation (11) with 
(11') yields identical solutions.   
The two firms produce identical goods, so perfect competition implies that consumer prices 
are equal:   
 𝑞�𝑃 = 𝑞�𝐺. (12) 
The consumer price for the subsidized firm's output is not equal to the price net of subsidies that 
the firm faces,  qGN. 
Finally, government policy determines the relative prices faced by the subsidized firm.  
Totally differentiating the definition  𝑟𝐺 ≡ 𝑟(1 − 𝛾)  yields 
                                                 
9 In the case of Cobb-Douglas production functions, we can write the condition 𝑤 − 𝑤𝐺 > 0 in terms of the 
parameters.  In the more general formulation here where we impose no functional forms, we cannot specify 𝑤 −
𝑤𝐺 > 0 in terms of the parameters.  However, since in practice one can check 𝑤 − 𝑤𝐺 > 0 directly, this is not a 
great concern.   
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 ?̂?𝐺 = ?̂? − 𝛾�, (13) 
where  ?̂?𝐺  and  ?̂?  again are proportional changes (e.g.  ?̂? = 𝑑𝑟/𝑟),  but  𝛾� ≡ 𝑑𝛾/(1 − 𝛾).  
Similarly, 
 ?̂?𝐺 = ?̂? − 𝜙�  (14) 
 𝑞�𝐺𝑁 = 𝑞�𝐺 + 𝜀̂ , (15) 
where  𝜙� ≡ 𝑑𝜙/(1 −𝜙)  and  𝜀̂ = 𝑑𝜀/(1 + 𝜀).   
The model consists of equations (1) through (15).  The five exogenous policy variables are  
𝜀̂, ?̂?,𝜙�, 𝛾�,𝐿��𝐺 . The sixteen endogenous variables are: 
 𝐾�𝑃, 𝐿�𝑃,𝐾�𝐺 , 𝐿�𝐺 , ?̂?,𝑤� , 𝑞�𝑃,𝑃�, 𝑞�𝐺 ,𝐺�, ?̂?𝐺 ,𝑤�𝐺 , ?̂?𝐺 , 𝑞�𝐺𝑁 ,𝐸�𝐺 ,𝐸�𝑃.  The model does not determine the price 
level, so the solution requires a normalization.  We normalize relative to the price of output by 
setting  𝑞�𝑃 = 0.  Now, the remaining fifteen endogenous variables are the solution to the linear 
system of equations (1)-(15). 
 
III. Solution 
We solve the model through successive substitution.  The steps of the solution method 
are available from the authors.  We present the results in two parts.  First, we present the 
incidence results, that is, the effect of policy changes on the returns to capital and to labor.  
Second, we present the emissions results. 
 
III.A Incidence 
We derive a closed-form solution for  ?̂?  and  𝑤� .  However, here we present only the 
expression for  ?̂?.  By subtracting equation (6) from equation (5) and invoking the normalization  
𝑞�𝑃 = 0,  it can be shown that  𝑤� = −𝜃𝑃𝐾𝜃𝑃𝐿 ?̂? − 𝜃𝑃𝐸𝜃𝑃𝐿 ?̂?.  Thus, if the policy variable 𝜏 remains 
unchanged, then the sign of the change in the wage resulting from any other policy change is the 
opposite of the sign of the change in the rental rate.  This does not mean that one factor gains and 
one loses, since both of these prices are relative to an arbitrary numeraire.  Rather, if  ?̂? > 0 and  
𝑤� < 0, then labor bears a disproportionately high share of the burden of the policy change 
relative to capital. 






−𝜃𝐺𝐾𝜆𝐾𝐺�𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐾 − 2𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐿 + 𝑒𝐺,𝐿𝐿�𝛾� + 𝜆𝐾𝐺�𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐿 − 𝑒𝐺,𝐿𝐿�𝜀̂ +
−𝜃𝐺𝐸𝜆𝐾𝐺𝐵𝐺𝜙� + 𝜆𝐾𝑃 �𝜆𝐾𝐺𝜆𝐾𝑃 − 𝜆𝐿𝐺𝜆𝐿𝑃� 𝐿��𝐺 + (𝜃𝐺𝐸𝜆𝐾𝐺𝐵𝐺 + 𝜃𝑃𝐸𝜆𝐾𝑃𝐵𝑃)?̂?�  (16) 
Here  𝐵𝑃 ≡ 𝑒𝑃,𝐾𝐸 − 𝑒𝑃,𝐸𝐿 − 𝑒𝑃,𝐾𝐿 + 𝑒𝑃,𝐿𝐿,  𝐵𝐺 ≡ 𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐸 − 𝑒𝐺,𝐸𝐿 − 𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐿 + 𝑒𝐺,𝐿𝐿, and 
𝐷 ≡ −𝜆𝐾𝐺𝜃𝐺𝐾�𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐾 − 2𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐿 + 𝑒𝐺,𝐿𝐿� − 𝜃𝑃𝐾𝜆𝐾𝑃�𝑒𝑃,𝐾𝐾 − 2𝑒𝑃,𝐾𝐿 + 𝑒𝑃,𝐿𝐿�. The appendix shows 
that  𝐷 is positive given constant returns to scale.  
Given that 𝐷 is positive, the coefficient on  𝛾�  in the expression for  ?̂?  must be positive. 
An increase in 𝛾, the subsidy to capital, increases the demand for capital by the subsidized firm, 
which pushes up the price of capital.10 
The sign of the coefficient on  𝜙�  is opposite of the sign of BG. We show in the appendix 
that BG < 0 if and only if an increase in emissions reduces the marginal product of capital 
(𝑓𝐾𝐸 < 0).  Assume this condition holds, and it follows that the sign of the coefficient on 𝜙� is 
positive. An increase in the emissions tax subsidy 𝜙 decreases the price of emissions for the 
subsidized firm.  This creates an output effect that expands production, increasing demand for 
capital and therefore its price.  Only if capital and emissions are strong substitutes, so that 𝑒𝑃,𝐾𝐸 
is positive and large enough to dominate the three other negative terms in 𝐵𝑃, does a substitution 
effect dominate, and an increase in the emissions tax subsidy reduces the demand for and price 
of capital.  The coefficient on ?̂? is negative, since an increase in ?̂? increases the price of 
emissions.11 
An increase in the output subsidy can be viewed as equivalently a decrease in the price of 
all three inputs. The coefficient on 𝜀̂ in equation (16) is positive.  The increase in the output 
subsidy creates only an output effect, causing the subsidized firm to want to expand production.  
But because its labor input is fixed at  𝐿�𝐺 ,  it can only expand by increasing its capital and 
emissions demand.  This unambiguously raises the return to capital. 
The coefficient on the labor constraint, 𝐿��𝐺 , has the same sign as the expression 
𝜆𝐾𝐺 𝜆𝐾𝑃⁄ − 𝜆𝐿𝐺 𝜆𝐿𝑃⁄ .  This expression is positive when the subsidized firm is capital-intensive 
relative to the private firm; that is, when firm G  has a higher capital-to-labor ratio than P.  One 
                                                 
10 Since the supply of capital is fixed, the increase in capital in the subsidized firm replaces demand in the private 
firm through the higher interest rate.   
11 Technically, we assume that emissions and capital do not switch from being substitutes to complements or the 
reverse.  If so, then it is possible that emissions and capital are substitutes for one firm, and complements for the 
other.  In this case, a decrease in ?̂? may have a different effect than an increase in 𝜙� as  ?̂? directly affects emissions 
of both firms.  
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might think that a tightening of the labor constraint must hurt labor, since it is forcing its quantity 
employed to be lower.  However, there is a fixed labor stock, and any reduction in labor used in 
one firm is matched by an increase in labor in the other firm. Rather, a tightening of the labor 
constraint is a burden that falls only on the subsidized firm. If the subsidized firm is capital-
intensive, then that burden will fall harder on capital than on labor, and the price of capital falls. 
 
III.B. Emissions 
 Consider first the effect on emissions in the private sector  EP.  Instead of presenting a 
closed-form solution, it is more helpful to present an intermediate equation in the solution steps 
that expresses the change in emissions as a function of just the labor constraint, the emissions 
price, and the endogenous capital price: 
 𝐸�𝑃 = −𝜆𝐿𝐺𝜆𝐿𝑃 𝐿��𝐺 + 𝜃𝑃𝐸�𝑒𝑃,𝐸𝐸 − 2𝑒𝑃,𝐸𝐿 + 𝑒𝑃,𝐿𝐿�?̂? + 𝜃𝑃𝐾𝐵𝑃?̂?.  (17) 
If  𝐿�𝐺   decreases, then more labor must be used in the private firm, and holding all else constant 
this increases the amount of emissions used in the private firm (from equation (4)).  If the 
emissions price 𝜏 increases, then holding all else constant the emissions used in the private firm 
decreases.  Lastly, if the policy change is such that the price of capital increases, then the 
quantity of emissions used in the private sector decreases as long as  BP < 0.  When capital and 
emissions are very substitutable,  BP > 0,  the substitution effect from the capital price increase 
dominates, and emissions increases.   
 All of the effects on emissions in the private firm from any of the policy changes occur 
via their effect on  r,  as seen in equation (17), except for the additional effects from  𝐿��𝐺   and  ?̂?  
(which also affect  ?̂?).  The closed-form solution for  𝐸�𝑃  can be found by substituting equation 
(16) into equation (17).  The results provide the same intuition as does equation (17).  This 
solution is presented in tabular form in Table 1 (along with the closed-form solution for  𝐸�𝐺 ,  
discussed below).  For each row in Table 1, the entry under the  𝐸�𝑃  column is the coefficient on 
that row’s exogenous variable.  For instance, the coefficient on  𝛾�  in the closed-form expression 




𝜃𝑃𝐾𝐵𝑃𝜃𝐺𝐾𝜆𝐾𝐺�𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐾 − 2𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐿 + 𝑒𝐺,𝐿𝐿�. 
When  BP < 0,  this coefficient is negative.  An increase in 𝛾 increases r, which decreases  EP. 
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The coefficients on  𝐿��𝐺   and  ?̂?  include both the direct effect in the equation (17) and the indirect 
effects via the effects on  ?̂? from equation (16). 
 An analogous expression for  𝐸�𝐺   is 
 𝐸�𝐺 = 𝐿��𝐺 + 𝜃𝐺𝐸�𝑒𝐺,𝐸𝐸 + 𝑒𝐺,𝐿𝐿��?̂? − 𝜙�� + �𝑒𝐺,𝐸𝐿 − 𝑒𝐺,𝐿𝐿�𝜀̂ + 𝜃𝐺𝐾𝐵𝐺(?̂? − 𝛾�).  (18) 
The first term comes directly from equation (8), where if nothing else changes, then the change 
in emissions equals the change in labor.  The second term shows that the change in the net 
emissions price to the subsidized firm, ?̂? − 𝜙�, negatively affects the emissions used by the 
subsidized firm.  The third term demonstrates that in increase in the subsidized firm's output 
subsidy,  𝜀,  increases its use of the emissions input.  Lastly, the final term is the effect of the 
change in the net price of capital to the subsidized firm,  ?̂? − 𝛾�.  It includes the endogenous  ?̂?.  
When the net price increases, the quantity of emissions used decreases, unless the substitution 
effect between capital and emissions dominates and  BG > 0.   
 As with equation (17), equation (18) is not a closed-form expression, but the closed-form 
solution can be found by substituting in equation (16).  This is presented in the second column of 
Table 1.  Most of the resulting closed-form coefficients conform to the intuition presented by 
merely examining equation (18).  For instance, the coefficient on  𝜀̂  in the closed-form 
expression for  𝐸�𝐺  is 
�𝑒𝐺,𝐸𝐿 − 𝑒𝐺,𝐿𝐿� + 1𝐷 �𝜃𝐺𝐾𝐵𝐺𝜆𝐾𝐺�𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐿 − 𝑒𝐺,𝐿𝐿��. 
The first two terms in the first set of parentheses are positive and represent the direct effect that 
can be seen in equation (18), and the rest of the terms are from the effect of  𝜀̂ on ?̂?.  Equation 
(16) shows that an increase in 𝜀 will increase r.  Thus, combined with equation (18), as long as  
BG < 0, this second term will be negative.  In this case the direct effect from 𝜀̂ shown in equation 
(18) and the indirect effect via its effect on  ?̂?  move in opposite directions. 
 One other closed-form coefficient is worth discussing.  The coefficient on  𝐿��𝐺  in the 
expression for  𝐸�𝐺  is 1
𝐷𝜆𝐿𝑃
�−𝜆𝐿𝑃 𝜆𝐾𝑃𝜃𝑃𝐾�𝑒𝑃,𝐾𝐾 − 2𝑒𝑃,𝐾𝐿 + 𝑒𝑃,𝐿𝐿�+ 𝜃𝐺𝐾�𝜆𝐾𝐺𝜆𝐿𝑃�𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐿 − 𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐾� + 𝜆𝐾𝑃𝜆𝐿𝐺(𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐿 − 𝑒𝐺,𝐿𝐿�+ (𝜆𝐾𝐺𝜆𝐿𝑃 − 𝜆𝐿𝐺𝜆𝐾𝑃)�𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐸 − 𝑒𝐺,𝐸𝐿��}    
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All of the terms in this expression are positive, with the exception of the last line of the 
expression.  The first part of the last line,  𝜆𝐾𝐺𝜆𝐿𝑃 − 𝜆𝐿𝐺𝜆𝐾𝑃,  is positive whenever the 
subsidized firm is capital-intensive.  The second part of the last line,  𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐸 − 𝑒𝐺,𝐸𝐿,  is positive 
whenever capital is a better substitute for emissions than is labor, in the subsidized firm.  Most of 
the coefficient is positive and picks up the fact that a reduction in  𝐿�𝐺   is a burden on the 
subsidized firm and causes it to contract, reducing its demand of input  EG.  However, the firm 
can also substitute among its inputs.  The subsidized firm could respond to its requirement to 
decrease labor demand (i.e. its increase in the shadow price of labor) by demanding more 
emissions or more capital.  If it is capital-intensive and if labor is a better substitute for emissions 
than is capital, then the increase in the shadow price will lead to a substitution effect that works 
to increase emissions in that sector.  Even in this case, this effect will only dominate if it is larger 
than all of the other positive terms in the above coefficient.   
 We also examine the change in total emissions from both firms,  E.  Since this is the sum 
of  EP  and  EG,  the proportional change in emissions  𝐸� = 𝐸𝑃𝐸 𝐸�𝑃 + 𝐸𝐺𝐸 𝐸�𝐺;  i.e. it is the sum of 
the two firms’ proportional change in emissions, weighted by the share of total emissions for 
each firm.  We present the expression for  𝐸�  in terms of the endogenous variable  ?̂?  rather than a 








� 𝐿��𝐺 + �𝐸𝑃𝐸 𝜃𝑃𝐸�𝑒𝑃,𝐸𝐸 − 2𝑒𝑃,𝐸𝐿 + 𝑒𝑃,𝐿𝐿� + 𝐸𝐺𝐸 𝜃𝐺𝐸�𝑒𝐺,𝐸𝐸 + 𝑒𝐺,𝐿𝐿�� ?̂?+ �𝐸𝐺
𝐸
(−𝜃𝐺𝐸)�𝑒𝐺,𝐸𝐸 + 𝑒𝐺,𝐿𝐿��𝜙� + �𝐸𝐺𝐸 �𝑒𝐺,𝐸𝐿 − 𝑒𝐺,𝐿𝐿�� 𝜀̂ + �𝐸𝐺𝐸 (−𝜃𝐺𝐾)𝐵𝐺� 𝛾�+ �𝐸𝑃
𝐸
𝜃𝑃𝐾𝐵𝑃 + 𝐸𝐺𝐸 𝜃𝐺𝐾𝐵𝐺� ?̂? 
The first coefficient in this equation shows that the effect of  𝐿��𝐺   on  𝐸�  depends on both the 
factor shares of labor across the firms and on the allocation of emissions across the two firms.  If 
the subsidized sector has a large share of total emissions, then this coefficient is likely to be 
positive, since an increase in the allowed labor in the subsidized sector will allow it to expand 
and demand more labor. 
 Every term in the next coefficient, on  ?̂?,  is negative, since a higher emissions tax will 
reduce emissions from both firms.  Likewise, the coefficient on  𝜙�  is positive, since an increase 
in the emissions tax subsidy will reduce the subsidized firm’s emissions.  The coefficient on  𝜀̂  
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is positive, since an increase in the output subsidy to the subsidized firm will expand output and 
increase its demand for emissions.  Likewise, the coefficient on the capital subsidy  𝛾�  is positive 
so long as  BG < 0;  a higher subsidy encourages the subsidized firm to expand and therefore 
demand more emissions. 
 All of the aforementioned effects represent output effects, while all of the substitution 
effects are contained in the coefficient on  ?̂?.  This coefficient is negative so long as  BG  and  BP  
are both negative.  If any exogenous policy changes ends up increasing the capital rental rate 
(relative to the numeraire), then the substitution effect will cause both firms to reduce emissions. 
 
IV. Calibration and Simulation 
 We choose parameter values to calibrate the model to investigate the magnitude of the 
effects found from the analytical solutions, many of which were difficult to sign unambiguously.  
The 2006 China Statistical Yearbook provides data on capital and labor inputs, profits, and 
emissions.  Because the Chinese data (except emissions) are separated into state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and private firms, these data provide a good source for the calibration.  We 
consider the SOEs to be the subsidized sector and the private firms to be the private sector.   
 The data give the value of capital and labor inputs in both sectors, and thus we can 
directly calculate the input shares 𝜆𝐾𝑃, etc.  We chose sulfur dioxide as the pollutant.  The 
appendix shows that a calibration with chemical oxygen demand yields almost identical 
parameter values.  Calibration of other parameters, including the expenditure share parameters 
𝜃𝑖𝑗, is described in the Appendix.  The Allen elasticities of substitution in each sector are not 
provided in the China Statistical Yearbook.  Instead, we use the same values as in Fullerton and 
Heutel (2010).  Those values are based on earlier estimates reported in de Mooij and Bovenberg 
(1998), and they suggest that capital is a slightly better substitute for pollution than is labor.12  
We assume that the cross-price Allen elasticities are identical across the two sectors.  But, 
                                                 
12 De Mooij and Bovenberg (1998) actually present estimates of substitution between capital, labor, and energy, and 
they consider estimates from Western Europe.  Considine and Larson (2006) use data from US electric utilities and 
find that capital is a better substitute for pollution than is labor.  Intuitively, when pollution reductions are required, 
new capital is installed, and thus capital and pollution are substitutes.  An alternate estimate is provided by Lu and 
Zhou (2009), who estimate Allen elasticities between capital, labor, and energy for China.  They do not differentiate 
between private firms and SOEs.  They find that capital and energy are complements and that labor is a better 
substitute for energy than is capital. 
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because of the different expenditure shares across sectors, the own-price elasticities are not 
identical across sectors. 
 Table 2 summarizes the calibrated parameter values (the own-price elasticities are not 





).  The share of expenditures that goes towards pollution 
taxes in both industries  (𝜃𝐺𝐸   and  𝜃𝑃𝐸)  is very small.   
 We simulate the incidence and environmental effects of four different exogenous policy 
changes.  First, we set  𝛾� = 10%,  simulating an increase in the capital subsidy rate to the 
subsidized firm.  Second,  𝜀̂ = 10%,  simulating an increase in the output subsidy rate to the 
subsidized firm.  Third,  𝜙� = 10%,  simulating an increase in the pollution tax subsidy rate to the 
subsidized firm.  Last,  𝐿��𝐺 = −10%,  simulating an decrease in the minimum labor constraint 
faced by the subsidized firm (this is negative so that all four policy simulations are a benefit to 
the subsidized firm, although the direct subsidy S will in equilibrium decrease to leave the 
subsidized firm's profits unchanged).13  Panels B and C of Table 3 report the results from these 
four policy changes.  Row 1 in each of those panels represents the simulations using the base 
case parameter values; rows 2 through 5 represent sensitivity analysis of the elasticity parameters 
(see panel A). 
 Focusing first on the base case simulations, the effect of either the capital subsidy or the 
output subsidy on incidence  (?̂?  and  𝑤�)  is identical: a 10% increase in either subsidy increases 
the rental rate by 5.45% and decreases the wage rate by 2.32% (like the analytical results, these 
price changes are normalized relative to the price of the output good).  This change is driven by 
the factor share parameters.  Since the subsidized sector is capital-intensive, a subsidy to it is 
likely to benefit capital relatively more than labor.  The pollution tax subsidy in panel C does not 
affect the rental rate or the wage to two decimal places.  This is because pollution expenditure 
shares are so small that a change in that input price has minimal general equilibrium effects.  The 
change in the labor constraint reduces the capital price by 6.56% and increases the labor price by 
2.79%.  This may seem counterintuitive, since a decrease in the required use of labor seems like 
it should decrease demand for labor and therefore its price.  But, the overall labor resource 
constraint always binds, and thus the reduction of the labor constraint in the subsidized sector is 
                                                 
13 Note that since t  𝛾� ≡ 𝑑𝛾/(1 − 𝛾), 𝛾� = 10% corresponds to an increase in 𝛾 equal to t  𝑑𝛾 = 0.10 ∙ (1 − 𝛾) =0.043 = 7.5%.  Similarly, the increase in 𝜀̂ is 0.1 and the increase in 𝜙� is 0.02 or 2.5%.    
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equivalent to forcing more labor into the private sector.  Because the private sector is labor-
intensive, a reduction in the labor constraint increases the demand for labor relative to the 
demand for capital, driving up the wage.   
 Next, consider the pollution effects of all four policy simulations under the base case 
parameter values.  The capital subsidy and output subsidy both have identical effects on 
pollution in the private sector (a 0.83% reduction), since the private sector's demand responds 
only to the input prices, which are identical under the two policy changes.  By contrast, the 10% 
capital subsidy causes only a 0.33% increase in the subsidized sector's emissions, while the 10% 
output subsidy causes a 3.69% increase in the subsidized sector's emissions.  The output subsidy 
substantially alters the quantity of output produced by the subsidized sector, not just its relative 
input prices.  This increase in output of the subsidized sector is the primary driver of its increased 
emissions.  The change in the pollution tax subsidy has no substantial effect (to two digits) on the 
private sector's emissions, but it increases the subsidized sector's emissions by 3.36%.  Lastly, 
the change in the labor constraint increases the private sector's emissions and decreases the 
subsidized sector's emissions.  The decrease of 10% in the subsidized firm's labor requirement 
reduces its emissions by just under 10%.  This reflects the expression at the end of section III for 
the coefficient on  𝐿��𝐺  in the expression for  𝐸�𝐺 .  Although that expression could not be signed, 
most of its terms are positive, indicating a negative output effect (i.e. relaxing the labor 
constraint reduces emissions).  The labor constraint forces the subsidized firm to use more labor, 
and therefore produce more output, than is optimal. Relaxing the labor constraint therefore 
reduces output, which reduces demand for the pollution input. The negative terms indicate the 
substitution effects from substituting emissions for labor.  Since the overall sign ends up positive 
in this simulation, the output effect dominates. 
 Table 3 also considers alternate parameter values.  We consider alternate values for the 
substitution elasticities in production, since these are the parameters about which we know the 
least.  We investigate changes in two of the cross-price Allen elasticities for each of the two 
sectors.  In each of rows 2 through 5, we change one of those Allen elasticities to 1 and leave all 
other parameter values unchanged in the base case.  Row 2 in Table 3 sets  𝑒𝑃,𝐾𝐸 = 1;  this 
represents a case where emissions and capital are strong substitutes in the private sector.  In row 
3, emissions and labor are strong substitutes in the private sector  (𝑒𝑃.𝐸𝐿 = 1).  Rows 4 and 5 
make the same assumptions, respectively, in the subsidized sector  (𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐸 = 1  and  𝑒𝐺,𝐸𝐿 = 1).  
20 
 
The results of the simulations for each of these new parameter values are presented in the 
remaining rows of Table 3. 
 Consider first how these different elasticity values affect the incidence results  (?̂?  and  
𝑤�).  Differences between rows 1 through 5 for any of the four policy variables are smaller than 
two decimal places.  Substitution elasticities in production do not substantively affect general 
equilibrium factor prices. 
 Next, consider how the different elasticity values affect the emissions results  (𝐸�𝑃  and  
𝐸�𝐺).  For the capital subsidy  𝛾�,  the largest decrease in private sector emissions occurs in row 3, 
where labor and emissions are strong substitutes in the private sector.  Similarly, the only 
decrease in subsidized sector emissions occurs in row 4, where capital and emissions are strong 
substitutes in the subsidized sector.  In each of these rows, the changes in the relative input prices 
(the same across all rows) have different effects on the demand for emissions based on each 
sector’s substitution elasticity.  Changes in the substitution elasticity in one sector do not 
materially affect emissions in the other sector, however.    
 For the output subsidy 𝜀̂, the emissions from the private sector mimics its emissions 
under the capital subsidy 𝛾� since the factor prices are the same.  But the subsidized sector 
expands relative to the private sector under this policy, and so emissions increase in each row. 
When capital and emissions are strong substitutes (row 4), the response of subsidized emissions 
to the output subsidy is larger.  Since the price of emissions is fixed by policy, demand for 
emissions rises by relatively more than demand for capital, whose demand is moderated by the 
increase in price of capital. Similarly, the response of subsidized emissions is especially strong if 
emissions and labor are strong substitutes (row 5).  The price of emissions is fixed by policy, 
whereas the shadow price of labor increases, motivating the subsidized firm to substitute 
emissions for labor.    
 The emissions tax subsidy 𝜙� has no effect on emissions in the private sector since it does 
not change any prices that sector faces.  It changes the relative price of emissions for the 
subsidized sector, and thus the increased subsidy (lower net emissions price) increases the 
emissions of that sector.  When the substitutability between emissions and either input is large in 
the subsidized sector (rows 4 and 5), the increase in its emissions is larger. 
 The loosening of the labor constraint  (𝐿��𝐺 = −10%)  always increases emissions in the 
private sector and decreases emissions in the subsidized sector.  This is due to an output effect 
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(the private sector expands and the subsidized sector contracts).  But the magnitude of the change 
in emissions depends on the substitution effects.  When the private sector has more ability to 
substitute between emissions and labor (row 3), its emissions increase is larger.  When the 
subsidized sector has more ability to substitute between emissions and capital (row 4), its 
emissions decrease is larger. 
 Lastly, panel D of Table 3 explores the effect of these policy changes on total emissions, 
𝐸�.  The change in total emissions is a weighted average of the change in the emissions of the two 
sectors (𝐸� = 𝐸𝑃
𝐸
𝐸�𝑃 + 𝐸𝐺𝐸 𝐸�𝐺).  In addition to the four policy changes from panels B and C, in 
panel D we present the change in total emissions in response to a 10% increase in 𝜏, the 
emissions tax.  This tax increase directly applies to both the subsidized and private sectors, in 
contrast to the four other policies.   
 SOEs account for 75% of total sulfur emissions, so for cases in which private and SOE 
emissions move in opposite directions, the change in subsidized emissions receives more weight.  
Therefore, the capital subsidy increases total emissions slightly, because the larger effect on 
private sector emissions receives less weight.  Subsidizing the capital accumulation of pollution-
intensive SOEs has a surprisingly small effect on total emissions due to general equilibrium 
effects:  the resulting rise in the price of capital causes private firms to reduce output and 
therefore pollution. 
 In contrast, the output and pollution subsidies have a much larger effect on SOE 
emissions, so the increase in total emissions is still substantial, despite the offsetting reduction in 
emissions from the private sector. Similarly, relaxing the labor constraint has a much larger 
effect on emissions from SOEs, so overall emissions fall despite the increase in private sector 
emissions.   
 An increase in the pollution tax directly decreases pollution in both sectors.  Therefore, 
total emissions are usually more sensitive to the pollution tax than to other policies, which have 
offsetting effects on pollution across sectors.  However, relaxing the labor constraint actually 
decreases pollution more than increasing the pollution tax, since moving labor out of the 
subsidized sector causes output and therefore pollution to fall substantially in that sector. Further, 
changes in the output and emissions subsidies effect total emissions by a similar order of 





 We present an analytical general equilibrium model to study the effects of distortionary 
subsidies on incidence and on pollution.  Policies intended to support one firm or one sector, like 
input or output price subsidies, can also have unintended general equilibrium price effects and 
effects on environmental quality.  We calibrate the model to gauge the numerical magnitude of 
these effects, and in particular to examine how they depend on the substitution elasticities in 
production.  The incidence effects (factor prices) are relatively unaffected by substitution 
elasticities, but emissions are substantially affected by the substitution elasticities.  The better 
substitute pollution is for an input whose price increases, the more emissions will increase. 
 Many studies in environmental economics examine the effect of environmental 
regulation, such as pollution taxes, on the environment.  This paper argues that the unintended 
consequences of non-environmental policies on pollution are also important. Indeed, we show 
that reducing output and emissions subsidies to pollution-intensive firms reduces pollution by a 
similar order of magnitude as raising emissions taxes. Policies that reduce employment at 
subsidized firms have even larger effects. Further, reducing non-environmental subsidies has 
welfare benefits associated with moving capital and labor to more productive sectors, in addition 
to reducing pollution.  Therefore, the welfare benefits of reducing subsidies are likely to be 
greater than the welfare gains from raising pollution taxes.   
   Our model is simple and omits many salient features of an economy that might also 
affect emissions and incidence.  However, its simplicity is a virtue in that it allows us to isolate 
individual effects without confounding complications.  Our calibration is based on data from 
China, where our data source clearly delineates between subsidized and non-subsidized firms. 
The model can be applied to other economies and other industries.  Further work could consider, 
for example, how subsidies to domestic auto manufacturing firms affected prices and emissions 
from that sector in the United States, or how agricultural subsidies in OECD countries affect 
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Table 1: Solution for  𝑬�𝑷  and  𝑬�𝑮 






− 2𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐿+ 𝑒𝐺,𝐿𝐿� 
𝜃𝐺𝐾𝐵𝐺+ 𝜃𝐺𝐾2 �− 1𝐷�𝜆𝐾𝐺�𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐾






















− 2𝑒𝑃,𝐾𝐿 + 𝑒𝑃,𝐿𝐿�+ 𝜃𝐺𝐾�𝜆𝐾𝐺𝜆𝐿𝑃�𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐿 − 𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐾�+ 𝜆𝐾𝑃𝜆𝐿𝐺(𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐿 − 𝑒𝐺,𝐿𝐿�+ (𝜆𝐾𝐺𝜆𝐿𝑃 − 𝜆𝐿𝐺𝜆𝐾𝑃)�𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐸
− 𝑒𝐺,𝐸𝐿��} 
?̂? 𝜃𝑃𝐸�𝑒𝑃,𝐸𝐸 − 2𝑒𝑃,𝐸𝐿 + 𝑒𝑃,𝐿𝐿�+ 1
𝐷
𝜃𝑃𝐾𝐵𝑃(𝜃𝐺𝐸𝜆𝐾𝐺𝐵𝐺+ 𝜃𝑃𝐸𝜆𝐾𝑃𝐵𝑃) 














𝜃𝑃𝐸  0.0002 
𝜃𝐺𝐾 0.1795 
𝜃𝐺𝐿 0.8202 











Note:  Calibrated parameters use sulfur dioxide emissions as a measure of pollution.  Parameters using chemical 




Table 3: Simulation  
Panel A: Parameter Values 
 𝑒𝑃,𝐾𝐸 𝑒𝑃,𝐸𝐿 𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐸 𝑒𝐺,𝐸𝐿 
1 (base case) 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.3 
2  1 0.3 0.5 0.3 
3 0.5 1 0.5 0.3 
4 0.5 0.3 1 0.3 
5 0.5 0.3 0.5 1 
 
Panel B: Simulation Results 
 𝛾� = 10% 𝜀̂ = 10% 
 ?̂? 𝑤�  𝐸�𝑃 𝐸�𝐺  ?̂? 𝑤�  𝐸�𝑃 𝐸�𝐺  
1 5.45% -2.32% -0.83% 0.33% 5.45% -2.32% -0.83% 3.69% 
2 5.45% -2.32% -0.02% 0.33% 5.45% -2.32% -0.02% 3.69% 
3 5.45% -2.32% -1.97% 0.33% 5.45% -2.32% -1.97% 3.69% 
4 5.45% -2.32% -0.83% -0.07% 5.45% -2.32% -0.83% 4.18% 
5 5.45% -2.32% -0.83% 0.91% 5.45% -2.32% -0.83% 10.01% 
 
Panel C: Simulation Results 
 𝜙� = 10% 𝐿��𝐺 = −10% 
 ?̂? 𝑤�  𝐸�𝑃 𝐸�𝐺  ?̂? 𝑤�  𝐸�𝑃 𝐸�𝐺  
1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.36% -6.56% 2.79% 4.74% -9.52% 
2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.36% -6.56% 2.79% 3.76% -9.52% 
3 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.36% -6.56% 2.79% 6.11% -9.52% 
4 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4.26% -6.56% 2.79% 4.74% -10.11% 
5 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 9.10% -6.56% 2.79% 4.74% -8.69% 
 
Panel D: Simulation Results 
 𝛾� = 10% 𝜀̂ = 10% 𝜙� = 10% 𝐿��𝐺 = −10% ?̂? = 10% 
 𝐸� 𝐸� 𝐸� 𝐸� 𝐸� 
1 0.04% 2.57% 2.52% -5.97% -3.42% 
2 0.25% 2.77% 2.52% -6.21% -3.79% 
3 -0.24% 2.28% 2.52% -5.62% -4.64% 
4 -0.26% 2.93% 3.20% -6.41% -4.09% 
5 0.47% 7.31% 6.84% -5.35% -7.73% 
Note: Panel A shows the parameter values that are varied in simulations 2 through 5.  All other parameter values 
remain at their base case values (Table 2).  Panels B and C show simulation results for four endogenous variables (?̂?, 
𝑤� , 𝐸�𝑃,  and  𝐸�𝐺) in response to one of four exogenous policy changes.  Panel D shows simulation results for total 





Proof that 𝑫 > 𝟎. 
If 𝑒𝑖,𝐾𝐾 − 2𝑒𝑖,𝐾𝐿 + 𝑒𝑖,𝐿𝐿 is negative regardless of 𝑖 = 𝐺, 𝐿, then 𝐷 > 0. Dropping the 
subscript 𝑖 for convenience and using the definition of Allen elasticity, we have: 
𝑒𝐾𝐾 − 2𝑒𝐾𝐿 + 𝑒𝐿𝐿 = |𝐵𝐾𝐾||𝐵|𝐾2 − 2 |𝐵𝐾𝐿||𝐵|𝐾𝐿 + |𝐵𝐿𝐿||𝐵|𝐿2 = 1|𝐵|𝐾2𝐿2 (𝐿2|𝐵𝐾𝐾| − 2|𝐵𝐾𝐿|𝐾𝐿 + 𝐾2|𝐵𝐿𝐿|) 
Here 𝐵 is the bordered Hessian from the firm's cost minimization problem, and 𝐵𝑖𝑗 is the 
bordered Hessian with column 𝑖 being all zeros except a one at row 𝑗.  Since the determinant of 
the bordered Hessian is negative by concavity, we must show the last term is positive.  
Evaluating the determinants in the last term results in: 
𝐿2|𝐵𝐾𝐾| − 2|𝐵𝐾𝐿|𝐾𝐿 + 𝐾2|𝐵𝐿𝐿|= 2𝐿2𝑓𝐿𝑓𝐸−𝐿2𝑓𝐿2𝑓𝐸𝐸 − 𝐿2𝑓𝐸2𝑓𝐿𝐿+2𝐾𝐿𝑓𝐸𝑓𝐾𝑓𝐸𝐿 − 2𝐾𝐿𝑓𝐸2𝑓𝐾𝐿
− 2𝐾𝐿𝑓𝐾𝑓𝐿𝑓𝐸𝐸+2𝐾𝐿𝑓𝐸𝑓𝐿𝑓𝐾𝐸+2𝐾2𝑓𝐸𝑓𝐾𝑓𝐾𝐸 − 𝐾2𝑓𝐾2𝑓𝐸𝐸 − 𝐾2𝑓𝐸2𝑓𝐾𝐾 
Since 𝑓 is constant returns to scale, the marginal products are homogenous degree zero.  
Therefore: 
 𝑓𝐾𝐾 = −𝐿𝑓𝐾𝐿+𝐾𝑓𝐾𝐸𝐾 , (A1) 
 𝑓𝐿𝐿 = −𝐾𝑓𝐾𝐿+𝐸𝑓𝐸𝐿𝐿 , (A2) 
 𝐿𝑓𝐸𝐿 + 𝐾𝑓𝐾𝐸 = −𝐸𝑓𝐸𝐸 . (A3) 
Substituting in equations (A1)-(A2), collecting terms, and then substituting in (A3) results in: 
𝐿2|𝐵𝐾𝐾| − 2|𝐵𝐾𝐿|𝐾𝐿 + 𝐾2|𝐵𝐿𝐿| = −𝑓𝐸𝐸(𝐿𝑓𝐿 + 𝐾𝑓𝐾 + 𝐸𝑓𝐸)2 = −𝑓𝐸𝐸𝑌2 > 0. 
Here the last equality follows from Euler's theorem and the term is positive by concavity. Hence, 
we have: 
𝑒𝑖,𝐾𝐾 − 2𝑒𝑖,𝐾𝐿 + 𝑒𝑖,𝐿𝐿 = −𝑓𝑖,𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑖2|𝐵𝑖|𝐾𝑖2𝐿𝑖2 > 0. 
The sign of the above equation is independent of 𝑖 and is negative by concavity which completes 
the proof.  
 




𝐵𝐺 ≡ 𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐸 − 𝑒𝐺,𝐸𝐿 − 𝑒𝐺,𝐾𝐿 + 𝑒𝐺,𝐿𝐿, = 1|𝐵|𝐾𝐸𝐿2 (𝐿2|𝐵𝐾𝐸| − 𝐾𝐿|𝐵𝐸𝐿| − 𝐸𝐿|𝐵𝐾𝐿| + 𝐾𝐸|𝐵𝐿𝐿|). 
Evaluating the determinants, substituting in (A1)-(A2), and the (A3) yields: 
𝐵𝐺 = 1|𝐵|𝐾𝐸𝐿2 (−𝑓𝐾𝐸(𝐿𝑓𝐿 + 𝐾𝑓𝐾 + 𝐸𝑓𝐸)2) = −𝑓𝐾𝐸𝑌2|𝐵|𝐾𝐸𝐿2. 
Since the determinant of 𝐵 is negative by concavity, the above equation is positive if and only if 
an increase in emissions raises the marginal product of capital (𝑓𝐾𝐸 > 0). 
 
Calibration 
 The data in Appendix Table A1 come from the 2006 China Statistical Yearbook (CSY).  
The factor share ratios  𝜆𝑖𝑗  are calculated directly from these data, e.g.  𝜆𝐾𝑃 = 𝐾𝑃𝐾 = 59,628143,144 =0.4166.   
 
Calibration of policies  𝝓,𝜸  and  𝜺  
 Calibration of  𝜙 and  𝛾  depends on the functional form of the production function.  
Assuming Cobb-Douglas production, the firm's first order conditions (China has production 
taxes t, which we add and assume are identical for G and P) imply 
𝑟 = (1 − 𝑡)𝐹𝐾,𝑃 = (1 − 𝑡)𝛼 �𝑌𝑃𝐾𝑃�, 
𝑟𝐺 = 𝑟 1 − 𝛾1 − 𝜀 = 𝐹𝐾,𝐺 = 𝛼(1 − 𝑡) 𝑌𝐺𝐾𝐺 , 
where 𝛼 is the capital share parameter.  We set  𝜀 = 0,  since some argue in China that actually 
SOEs are forced to sell at below market prices.  These equations may then be combined to get 





Similarly, for  𝜙, 




= 1 − 𝜎𝑃
𝜎𝐺
 
Here  𝜎  is the emissions intensity of output.  Bajona and Kelly (2012) estimates  𝜎𝐺
𝜎𝑃
= 5  for SO2 




Construct  𝝉,  𝑬𝑮 








= 𝐸𝐺1 − 𝐸𝐺 𝑌𝑃𝑌𝐺   
𝐸𝐺 = 𝜎𝐺𝜎𝑃 𝑌𝐺𝐸
𝑌𝑃 + 𝜎𝐺𝜎𝑃 𝑌𝐺  
This gives emissions of  𝐸𝐺 = 642  for SO2 and  𝐸𝐺 = 382  for COD. 
 Wang and Wheeler (2005, footnote 13) reports 𝜏 equals 0.5 yuan/kilogram for COD and 
0.4 for SO2.  This corresponds to 0.05 100M yuan per 10K metric tons for SO2 and 0.04 for 
COD.14 
  
Construct 𝒓,  total subsidies 
To get the interest rate, we need to compute depreciation as depreciation is included in value 
added but not profits.  Assuming a depreciation rate of  𝛿 = 0.06,  we have: 
𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐺 = 𝛿𝐾𝐺 = 5,011 
and the same for private.  The interest rate is then 
𝑟 = 𝑟𝑘
𝑘
= 𝜋𝐺 + 𝜋𝑃 + 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐺 + 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑃
𝐾𝐺 + 𝐾𝑃 = 0.16 
This is a high interest rate, but probably not unreasonable given China's very fast economic 
growth.  We add depreciation to capital income in all the calculations below. 
 We now construct capital and emissions subsidies: 
𝛾𝑟𝐾𝐺 = 7,764 
𝜙𝜏𝐸𝐺 = 21 for SO2,  = 16  for COD. 
 
Calibration of Wages 
We have from the profit equations (including a tax 𝑡 on value added): 
𝜋𝐺 = (1 − 𝑡)𝐹(𝐾𝐺 , 𝐿𝐺 ,𝐸𝐺) − 𝑟𝐺𝐾𝐺 − 𝑤𝐿𝐺 − 𝜏𝐺𝐸𝐺 + 𝑆. 
                                                 
14 The emissions tax revenue does not measure all spending on environmental regulations, but total environmental 
compliance spending is still small relative to GDP. 
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Assuming after subsidy profits equal zero, we have: 
𝑤𝐿𝐺 = (1 − 𝑡)𝐹(𝐾𝐺 , 𝐿𝐺 ,𝐸𝐺) − 𝑟𝐺𝐾𝐺 − 𝜏𝐺𝐸𝐺 + 𝑆 = 𝑌𝐺 − 𝑡𝑌𝐺 − 𝑟𝐾𝐺 + 𝛾𝑟𝐾𝐺 − 𝜏𝐸𝐺 + 𝜙𝜏𝐸𝐺 + 𝑆 = 27,177 − (6,220 − 0.05 ∙ 642) + 7,764 − 0.05 ∙ 642 + 21 + 193 = 17,404. 
This assumes that the environmental taxes are counted in the data on total taxes paid.  The 
private data wage equation is the same equation with no subsidies, which results in  𝑤𝐿𝑃 =27,852.  The calibration is slightly different using COD instead of SO2. 
 Given the wage data, we have 
𝑆 = 𝑤𝐿𝐺 − 𝑤𝐺𝐿𝐺  = 17,211 
 
Calibration of Shares 
We calibrate the shares using the standard assumption that tax income is allocated proportionally 
to each factor according to their factor shares.  For private shares, we have 
𝜃𝑃𝐾𝑌𝑃 = 𝑟𝐾𝑃 + 𝜃𝑃𝐾(𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 − 𝑒𝑛𝑣. 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠𝑃) 
𝜃𝑃𝐾 = 𝑟𝐾𝑃𝑌𝑃 − (𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 − 𝑒𝑛𝑣. 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠𝑃) 
𝜃𝑃𝐾 = 11,86045,010 − 5,298 + 𝜏𝐸𝑃 = 0.2986 
Similarly, 
𝜃𝑃𝐿 = 𝑤𝐿𝑃𝑌𝑃 − (𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 − 𝑒𝑛𝑣. 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠𝑃) = 0.7012 
𝜃𝑃𝐸 = 𝜏𝐸𝑃𝑌𝑃 − (𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 − 𝑒𝑛𝑣. 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠𝑃) = 0.0002 
This is the calibration for SO2; the values for COD are only slightly different.   
 For the subsidized firm, we must also include the subsidy revenue. 
𝜃𝐺𝐾𝑌𝐺 = 𝑟𝐺𝐾𝐺 = 𝑟𝐾𝐺 − 𝛾𝑟𝐾𝐺 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 + 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜃𝐺𝐾(𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 − 𝑒𝑛𝑣. 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠𝐺) − 𝛾𝑟𝐾𝐺  
𝜃𝐺𝐾 = 𝑟𝐾𝐺 − 𝛾𝑟𝐾𝐺𝑌𝐺 − (𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 − 𝑒𝑛𝑣. 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠𝐺) 
𝜃𝐺𝐾 = 11,531 − 7,76427,177 − 6,220 + 21 = 0.1795 
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The share for G is lower, but this is a comparison of apples to oranges.  𝑟𝐾𝐺
𝑌𝐺
  is 0.55, which is 
higher than private as expected since SOEs tend to be more capital-intensive. 
 Similarly, 
𝜃𝐺𝐸 = 𝜏𝐸𝐺 − 𝜙𝜏𝐸𝐺𝑌𝐺 − (𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 − 𝑒𝑛𝑣. 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠𝐺) = 0.0002 
𝜃𝐺𝐿 = 𝑤𝐺𝐿𝐺𝑌𝐺 − (𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 − 𝑒𝑛𝑣. 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠𝐺) = 0.8202. 
We report only four significant digits, so the sum of shares differs slightly from one due to 
rounding.  
 
Appendix Table A1 
Variable Symbol Value 
SOE value added 𝑌𝐺 27,177 
Private value added 𝑌𝑃 45,010 
SOE capital 𝐾𝐺 83,515 
Private capital 𝐾𝑃 59,628 
SOE total employees 𝐿𝐺  1,875 
Private total employees 𝐿𝑃 5,021 
SOE taxes paid N/A 6,220 
Private taxes paid N/A 5,298 
SOE profits 𝑟𝑘𝐺  6,520 
Private profits 𝑟𝑘𝑃 8,283 
SO2 Emissions 𝐸 855 
COD Emissions 𝐸 493 
Subsidies to loss making enterprises 𝑆 193 
Notes: Data are from the 2006 China Statistical Yearbook, tables 14.4 and 14.8, except: SO₂ emissions which is 
from table 12-11, subsidies to loss making enterprises which is table 8.2, and COD which is table 2.11 of the China 
Environment Yearbook. All numbers are 100 million yuan except total employees which are in 10,000 workers, and 
emissions which are 10,000 tons.  The 2006 yearbook reports data from 2005. 
 
